Which measures of human capital are the best predictors of good institutions: Quality measures such as cognitive skill scores or average years of education? Using a new institutional quality measure, the International Property Rights Index (IPRI), we find that average years of education is rarely statistically significant across specifications while cognitive skill measures are significant, robust, and large in magnitude. We use two databases of cognitive skills: estimates of national average IQ from Lynn and coauthors (2002, 2006, 2010a,b) and estimates of cognitive ability based on PISA and TIMSS scores estimated by Rindermann et al. (2009) . The Rindermann cognitive ability scores estimate mean performance as well as performance at the 5 th and 95 th percentiles of the national population. Performance at the 95 th percentile is the most robust predictor of institutional quality while the 5 th percentile is less robust. National average IQ and the 95 th percentile of cognitive ability are both robust predictors of overall institutional quality controlling for years of education, legal system, GDP per capita, and geography dummies. Some possible microfoundations of this relationship are discussed.
Introduction
Does human capital improve economic institutions? We provide new evidence on this important question, and in cross-country regressions find that standardized test scores, including estimates of national average IQ, are robust predictors of institutional quality as measured by the International Property Rights Index (IPRI).
Microstructure provides reasons for this relationship to hold. One piece of microstructure comes from the reliable relationship between standardized test scores and patience: Psychologists and economists alike have found that those who perform better on IQ and related cognitive tests are more likely to behave patiently (Dohmen et al., 2010; Shoda et al., 1990; Warner and Pleeter, 2001 ). The finding is sufficiently routine that Shamosh and Gray (2008) have a metastudy of psychology studies on the topic. According to economic theory, patience should improve economic institutions through at least three channels:
1. Barro and Gordon show that the time inconsistency problem can be partly solved if the government is patient (1983) . The government's promise to respect property rights ex post is time inconsistent in a one-shot game but better equilibria are possible if governments are sufficiently patient.
2. If politics is a repeated game of factions that choose to "wait or predate" then a public good or prisoner's dilemma arises, and the folk theorem's key role for patience applies. These factions might include powerful bureaucrats deciding whether to become bribe-takers or political parties deciding whether to invest in stable long-run institutions at the expense of short-run political victories, for example.
3. Public officials and private businesses alike will have greater concern for their reputations if they are more patient. Judges will worry more about their legacy, entrepreneurs will worry more about a reputation for product quality, and potential malefactors will worry more about what others will think about them. The "shadow of the future" (Axelrod, 1984) looms larger among the patient.
There is another microfounded reason why groups with high cognitive skills may be more likely to build better institutions. This is because key economic ideas are often quite complicated, and difficult to understand. Caplan and Miller (2010) found that in the General Social Survey, high IQ respondents and more educated respondents were more likely to agree with economists on the relative merits of market-oriented policies, confirming that the higher-scoring and better-educated are more likely to see the invisible hand.
Countries with better institutions are likely to have greater prosperity, healthier environments, higher quality education establishments, and hence higher levels of human capital, so causation may also run from institutions to cognitive skills. But the patience and understanding microfoundations are likely to be of substantial significance. Our cross-country regressions will control for some preexisting factors contributing to good institutions, and also control for GDP per capita, a possible independent driver of cognitive skills.
Previous work has demonstrated that nations that currently have higher cognitive skills indeed have better economic institutions by some measures. Vanhanen (2002, 2006) report strong positive bivariate correlations, and Potrafke (2012) reports that national cognitive skill predicts lower corruption after including a variety of controls.
In past work in the economics, infectious disease (Eppig et al., 2010) , and psychology literatures, a widely-used measure of cognitive skill has been the national average IQ estimates of Vanhanen (2002, 2006) and Lynn and Meisenberg (2010a, b) ; we use this measure, which we discuss below. One of our innovations is to use a new set of national cognitive skill estimates created by Rindermann et al. (2009) based entirely on PISA and TIMSS scores. These scores are valuable in two ways: First, because of their use by Hanushek and coauthors (2000 Hanushek and coauthors ( , 2010 Hanushek and coauthors ( , 2012 , PISA and TIMSS scores are more familiar to economists than the national IQ measures. And second, coauthors (2009, 2011) use data on standard deviations to estimate 5 th and 95 th percentile cognitive skill scores for each country. This will allow us to give preliminary tests of three different hypotheses about the link between cognitive skill and institutional outcomes: The weakest link theory, the median voter theory, and the smart fraction theory.
Data and Methods
The national average IQ data come from Vanhanen (2002, 2006) and from Lynn and Meisenberg (2002 . Henceforth we refer to these as the Lynn estimates: They draw on a wide variety of journal articles, international cognitive tests, and comprehensive samples assembled by IQ testing companies. The Lynn IQ scores are the first of their kind and have been used across the social and biological sciences (inter alia, Eppig et al., 2010; Ram, 2007; Schneider, 2006, 2010; Weede and Kämpf, 2002) . In this dataset, average IQ in the UK is defined equal to 100, following standard practice. Global mean IQ (unweighted by country size) is 90 IQ points and the standard deviation across countries in the 2002 data is 11 IQ points. By comparison, the standard deviation of IQ within the rich countries equals 15 IQ points. The most serious critique of the Lynn and Vanhanen database comes from a series of papers by Wicherts et al. (2009 Wicherts et al. ( , 2010a who focus on the quality of the subSaharan African data; the debate between these authors and Lynn and Meisenberg Table A1 shows descriptive statistics of all variables. We estimate the model with ordinary least squares (OLS) and robust standard errors. Tables 1 and 2 show the results when the overall property rights index is used as dependent variable. The cognitive skill measures have bivariate correlations of between 0.5 and 0.65 with the property rights index. Controlling for continent dummies does not change this strong relationship. The cognitive skill measures are statistically significant at the 1% and 5% level in columns (1), (5) and (9) in Tables 1   and 2 .
Results
Simultaneously adding controls for legal origin and log GDP per capita, reduces the effect size of all coefficients. All IQ measures remain significant at conventional levels as do mean CA and 95 th percentile CA; the 5 th percentile has a more fragile relationship with institutional quality and lacks statistical significance in column (11) in Table 2 . The relative fragility of the 5 th percentile is evidence against a "weakest link" theory, where the cognitive skills of the poorer performers have a strong effect on institutional quality.
Inclusion of years of education as a control does not substantially change these results, although the CA mean variables just lacks statistical significance at the 10% level (column 4 in Table 1 ).
The full-control specifications may be lower bound estimates, since they eliminate the possibility that, for instance, higher cognitive skills directly raise a nation's GDP per capita or the derived demand for education, which in turn promote institutional quality. The Rindermann et al. cognitive ability results yield similar size effects. Tables 3 to 8 show the results for the legal, physical and intellectual property rights indices. The IQ variables have a large effect on the legal property rights index (Table   3) , and a much smaller effect on the physical property rights index (Table 5 ).
Intellectually property protection has an especially strong relationship with 95 th percentile CA, which may drive the overall result (Table 8) .
And as noted above, Winsorizing the sub-Saharan African IQ scores to a minimum of 76 or 80 does not substantially change any of the above results (Tables 9 to 16 ); for the overall property rights index, results are modestly more robust with the Winsorized data.
Conclusion
Economists have long searched for fundamental causes of good economic performance, and many have long believed that some economic institutions were better than others at achieving good performance. However, the causes of good institutions have remained a topic of controversy.
The results presented here are consistent with the hypothesis that higher levels of cognitive skill help citizens become more patient and better informed. Thus, such citizens may be more likely to perceive the benefits of the impartial rule of law and more likely to enforce rules even when those rules impose a short-run cost.
Fortunately, psychologists and others have investigated how to raise broad-based cognitive skills and multiple channels appear to exist for raising IQ and other measures of cognitive skills (Armor, D. J. 2003; Sternberg, 2008; Behrman et al., 2004) . Also, the Flynn Effect (Flynn, 1987; Williams, 2013; Neisser, 1998) ), the still poorly-understood long-run rise in IQ scores documented in developed countries in the 20 th century, appears to have only begun in the poorest countries (Nisbett et al., 2012) . The Flynn Effect is of course strong evidence for large recent environmental influences on some types of cognitive skill. Policies that improve the nutrition, educational quality and the natural environment of the world's poorest nations will, one hopes, have substantial effects on long-run institutional quality. Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
